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Firms in the U.S. rely on highly skilled immigrants, particularly in the science and
engineering sectors. Yet the recent politics of immigration marks a substantial change
to U.S. immigration policy. We implement a conjoint experiment that isolates the
causal effect of nativist, anti-immigrant, pronouncements on where skilled potential-
migrants choose to immigrate to. While these policies have a significantly negative
effect on the destination choices of Chilean and U.K. student subjects, they have lit-
tle effect on the choices of Indian and Chinese student subjects. These results are
confirmed through an unobtrusive test of subjects’ general immigration destination
preferences. Moreover, there is some evidence that the negative effect of these nativist
policies are particularly salient for those who self-identify with the Left.
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The recent politics of immigration have added to the urgency and importance of under-
standing why skilled immigrants move. There is strong evidence that the economic returns
to U.S. industry from science and engineering immigration are substantial (Kerr, 2018). And
two countries in particular, China and India, have been an important source of science and
engineering talent (Kerr and Lincoln, 2010). Moreover, there is reason to believe that U.S.
firms, and those in other countries, are becoming increasingly dependent on this global talent
pool.
Recent research has identified factors that shape the immigration decision – economic
growth, potential wages, and immigration policies all determine where an immigrant decides
to move. And historically these factors have all played to the advantage of, in particular,
the technology sectors of the U.S. economy. While the U.S. has historically attracted many
high-skilled immigrants (Khoo, 2014), this might be changing (USCIS, 2017). Stricter visa
quotas and non-point-based systems make it harder to immigrate.
In this essay we focus on the effect of politics on the immigration decision – in particular
the decision of high-skilled immigrants to move to the U.S. We explore whether political
populism, nativism, and anti-immigrant rhetoric – ‘Trumpian policies’ – might deter high-
skilled immigration to the U.S. Nativism is “an ideology, which holds that states should
be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (the nation) and that non-native
elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous nation-
state” (Mudde, 2012, p.2). There is evidence that nativism has been on the rise in the
U.S. (Wadhwa, 2009). The ‘Muslim ban’ – immigration restrictions for Muslim-majority
countries; defamations of Hispanics and African Americans as criminals and rapists; the claim
that immigrants take American jobs; that Mexico is sending their criminals to the U.S.; and
Trump’s alleged dismissal of Haiti, El Salvador, and African nations as “shithole countries”
are some examples of nativist frames in contemporary U.S. discourse. This nativism forms a
key constituent part of populist party strategies on the Right (Mudde, 2013), and is evident
in Trump’s rhetoric and political actions.
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Our contribution is to estimate the impact of policy declarations on immigration deci-
sions. More specifically, we measure how hostile nativist actions and rhetoric impact the
destination preferences of high-skilled immigrants. Our test case is Trump’s anti-immigrant
rhetoric. The conventional wisdom is that, yes, nativist immigration policy has short-term
political pay-offs but significant collateral economic costs. We find that these economic costs
vary dependent on the migrant’s country of origin: while nativist policies deter some poten-
tial migrants, this negative effect is not observed for Indian and Chinese student subjects.
Our experimental study is unique, first in that it focuses on the migration preferences
of university student subjects with relatively high skills, and secondly that it identifies the
causal effect of nativist politics on their immigration decisions. We conduct a conjoint
survey experiment on students from the Nuffield Centre for Experimental Social Sciences
(CESS) subject pools in Chile, China, India and the U.K. to identify causal drivers of
emigration preferences. China and India represent the two most important talent pools for
U.S. technology firms while immigrants from Chile and the U.K. have historically favored
the U.S. as a destination.1
The experimental design allows us to isolate the causal effect of nativist, anti-immigrant,
pronouncements on where these university student subjects would choose to immigrate. The
two “nativist” policy pronouncement treatments highlighted ‘Muslim bans’ and ‘Deportation
of illegal immigrants’. For the Chilean and U.K. student subjects these attributes overall
had a significantly negative effect on their choice of an immigration destination. For the
Indian and Chinese student subjects, on the other hand, the overall treatment effects were,
at best, much weaker and typically not significant. The third treatment, identifying the U.S.
as the immigration destination, had a significant negative effect on the choice of Chilean
student subjects; had a weak negative effect for British subjects; but, again, had no sig-
1Kerr and Lincoln (2010) document the importance of Chinese and Indian immigrants for U.S. high
technology firms by analyzing H-1B visas during the period (these are visas that are primarily awarded to
science and engineering and computer-related occupations). During this period about 40 percent and 10
percent of H-1B recipients came from India and China, respectively. Other countries accounted for less than
5 percent.
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nificant effect for the Chinese and Indian samples. As a robustness check, we included an
incentivized real effort task experiment to recover, unobtrusively, subjects’ immigration des-
tination preferences. Consistent with the conjoint experiment findings, Chinese and Indian
student subjects exhibit a significantly stronger preference for the U.S. than is the case for
the Chilean and British student subjects.
To explore whether differences in treatment effects might be explained by non-geographic
factors, we also test for alternative sources of treatment effect heterogeneity across the four
experimental samples. We do not find that our results are driven by age differences between
countries or different likelihoods of emigrating. We do find some suggestive evidence that
the negative effect of nativist policies are particularly salient for subjects who self-identify
with the political Left. These results further support our main finding that student subjects’
responses to the anti-immigrant primes differ substantially dependent on their country of
origin.
Nativist Rhetoric and Immigration
As we pointed out, the use of nativist rhetoric, specifically anti-immigrant pronouncements
by elected government officials, is on the rise. And there is considerable evidence suggesting
that politicians articulating these themes can reap electoral benefits (Hooghe and Dasson-
neville, 2018; Dekeyser and Freedman, 2018), at least in the short run (James E. Monogan
and Doctor, 2017). Between January 2018 and January 2019, President Trump tweeted
about his proposed border wall, a clear use of nativist anti-immigrant rhetoric, 179 times,
and tweeted about borders, more generally, 391 times. Figure 1 shows the cumulative use of
these tweets over this period.2 While certain political episodes catalyse Trump’s usage of this
rhetoric, it is nevertheless clear that this nativist frame has continuously and consistently
been deployed during his presidential tenure.
2All tweets from @realdonaldtrump since 01 January 2018 to 31 January 2019 mentioning ”wall” and




























































Figure 1: Cumulative tweets by President Trump mentioning ’border’ or ’wall’, January 2018
- January 2019.
While there clearly are positive electoral payoffs from this nativist rhetoric, it is plausible
that these public anti-immigrant signals have significant reputation costs. By undermining a
country’s reputation as an immigration destination for skilled immigrants, this rhetoric could
impose serious economic costs on firms that depend on foreign human capital. We implement
a conjoint experiment in multiple countries designed to test this specific proposition. And
we focus on the costs to the U.S.’s reputation as an immigration destination as a result of
Trump’s nativist rhetoric.
An important presumption here is that there are significant numbers of firms, or large
sectors of the economy, for whom skilled immigrant workers are an essential component of
their labor inputs. Certainly in the case of U.S. firms, there is persuasive evidence that
foreign skilled immigrants have contributed significantly to certain sectors of the economy.
Kerr and Lincoln (2010) use changes in the H-1B worker population as an instrument to
identify the effect of science and engineering immigration on firm patenting in the U.S, over
the period 1995–2008. Most importantly, they find a strong relationship between immi-
gration and innovation: “A 10% growth in the H-1B population corresponded with a 1–4
percent higher growth in Indian and Chinese invention for each standard deviation increase
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in city dependency” (p.475). This study, and others (Peri, 2007; Hunt, 2011), highlight the
important contribution of science and engineering immigrants, particularly from China and
India, to innovation in U.S. firms.
The U.S. has typically been successful at attracting science and engineering immigrants.
30 percent of all degree-level (and higher) science and engineering workers in the U.S. are
foreign-born, double the number in 1993 (National Science Board, 2018). A number of factors
potentially play important roles in attracting skilled immigrants (Ortega and Peri, 2013).
Unsurprisingly, earnings play a preeminent role in explaining the immigration destination
decision (Czaika and Parsons, 2017). But Ortega and Peri (2013) make a strong empirical
case that immigration policy initiatives also impact immigration flows and that the impact
of these initiatives is quite quick. Tightening of immigrant entry rules in the European
Union as a result of the Maastricht and Schengen treaties lead to rapid decreases in the
flow of inward immigration. Mayda (2010) draws similar conclusions from the analysis of
OECD country immigration flows. Clearly policies that either tighten or loosen immigration
visa requirements will be quickly incorporated into skilled immigrants’ choice of emigration
destination.
A country’s provision of public goods may also affect the immigration decision. Education
is one of these public goods. As Kerr (2018, Chapter 5) points out, education infrastructure
is a magnate for skilled immigrants. A second, less obvious public good, concerns the social
welfare infrastructure. We have evidence to suggest that the generosity of welfare benefits
affects the migration destination decisions of low-skilled immigrants (Borjas, 1999; Boeri,
2010). It is less clear whether they should be a magnet or deterrent to potential skilled
immigrants. Skilled migrants might be deterred by generous welfare states, as they imply
higher taxes and lower economic returns from migration (Borjas, 1999), though others con-
clude that there is no significant relationship between welfare and immigration (Giulietti
et al., 2013).
While it is certainly true that attracting global talent has become an increasing priority
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for governments in developed countries around the world, our understanding of precisely
what shapes these decisions is a work in progress (Kerr, 2018). As Ortega and Peri (2013)
point out, improving our understanding of the decision to emigrate remains an important
research challenge, and one that we now turn to.
Where will I go? High-skilled and well-educated potential emigrants will often have
some choice over the country to which they immigrate. What specifically enters into this
immigration utility function? Our characterization of their utility when choosing between
two countries builds on what we know about immigration attitudes more generally. One
of the very general findings from the literature on immigration attitudes is that we should
distinguish between narrow economic self-interest and broader socio-tropic policy preferences
(Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). With respect to how citizens view incoming immigrants
– i.e., the demand side of migration – there is considerable evidence that socio-tropic issues
trump economic self-interest in affecting attitudes. In fact, Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014,
p. 227) conclude that, “Overall, hypotheses grounded in self-interest have fared poorly,
meaning that there is little accumulated evidence that citizens primarily form attitudes
about immigration based on its effects on their personal economic situation.”
Our interest is in the preferences of those on the supply side – i.e., the countries where
potential migrants wish to relocate. A similar distinction between economic and socio-
tropic concerns, we believe, is relevant here too. In the case of supply, however, the narrow
economic self-interest should be more influential in shaping emigrant’s destination choices
since emigrating is a costly exercise on many dimensions. Moreover, much of what we know
about immigration patterns suggests that migration decisions respond to market signals. For
instance, the evidence cited earlier confirms that the volume of immigration is affected by
expected earnings and the costs of entry (Ortega and Peri, 2013; Czaika and Parsons, 2017).
Accordingly, we specifically expect earnings in the country to which immigrants move to be
influential in their decision calculus. In a similar vein, public goods provisions should affect
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the economic dimension of a potential migrants’ decision. In particular, basic social benefits
and the quality of education provision make a move to a given country, in theory, more or
less costly. In turn, they should affect the economic self-interest calculations of immigrants
and thus where they decide to move to.
On the other hand, given the evidence from the demand perspective, we expect socio-
tropic considerations, related to immigration policy, to also affect decision making of im-
migrants. Recent empirical evidence on the demand side suggest higher levels education
are correlated with positive attitudes toward immigration (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014;
Ford, Morrell and Heath, 2012). Moreover, this correlation is attributed not to narrow self-
interest but rather to cultural values and broader socio-tropic preferences. Since our focus
is on the supply-side decisions made by young well-educated subjects who are prospective
high-skilled migrants, we would expect these individuals to be similarly pro-immigration. A
country’s anti-immigrant policies and rhetoric, therefore, should weigh negatively on their
choice of emigration destinations. More educated, and therefore more socio-tropically pro-
immigration individuals, should favour destinations that are similarly pro-immigration.
Since this mechanism is socio-tropic, high-skilled individuals might be put off migrating
to a destination by policies and rhetoric that seriously restrict immigration (or certain types
of immigration) even if it does not affect them directly. Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007)
analyse the 2003 European Social Survey and find that higher skilled respondents expressed
positive views for all types of, incoming, immigration. And there is also evidence that
younger age cohorts have much more positive attitudes, again, to all types of immigration
irrespective of whether they themselves are directly affected (McLaren and Paterson, 2019).
In summary, our expectation is that young potential migrants who are high-skilled would
respond negatively to nativist, anti-immigrant policies and rhetoric.
Context Very generally speaking we know that “national” publics can have quite different
opinions on specific policy issues. For example, there is an extensive literature exploring
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the extent of, and the explanations for, cross-national variations in the public’s preferences
for redistribution policies (Alesina, Stantcheva and Teso, 2018). Similarly, there is evidence
that public opinion regarding immigration policy varies quite significantly cross-nationally
(Heath and Richards, 2019). How and why these quite distinct national perspectives emerge
regarding immigration is beyond the scope of this essay. A contributing factor, we suspect,
is the role that immigration plays in a country’s labor market, historical settlements, and
ethnic conflict, for example.
We have selected four very different national contexts where we believe immigration has
played very different roles in their political and economic development. Immigration, and
the immigration debate, seems to have varied quite significantly across these four countries.
China, comparatively speaking, has virtually no immigration. For a range of reasons, the
policy status quo in China has been closed to immigration and the public salience of the issue
has been quite low. India has more significant levels of immigration, mostly from bordering
countries, and there is a political debate regarding the issue. Nevertheless, compared to
Europe and North America, immigrants represent a small fraction of the Indian population.
At the other extreme is the U.K. where foreign-born individuals make up around 15 percent
of the population and the immigration debate has been very salient.
It is clear that the nature of immigration policy, how it was discussed and debated,
would vary across these countries. Hence, the socio-tropic policy perspectives, i.e., how
immigration affected the country as a whole, would likely vary across these four cases. And
potential emigrants from these countries might have quite distinct immigration policy views.
Our conjecture is that anti-immigrant policies and rhetoric could, similarly, resonate more
positively (or less negatively) in some of these countries than in others. Before data collection,
though, we had no strong priors as to how this contextual variation might play out.
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Stated Preference Experiment
Design Isolating the effects on immigration decisions of nativist rhetoric is challenging.
We should ideally observe the immigration choices of potential migrants who are treated,
and not treated, with nativist rhetoric. But of course we are unlikely to observe actual
random assignment to treatment and control; and probably less likely to measure revealed
preferences under these conditions. Accordingly, we designed a conjoint experiment with
high-skilled subjects who are potential immigrants.3 In the conjoint experiment our student
subjects make binary choices over hypothetical immigration destinations that have randomly
assigned characteristics including variations in immigration policies. Separately, the subjects
make an incentivized decision that provides further insight into their preferred immigration
destinations.
Hence this is a stated preference experiment in which student subjects are asked to choose
between two immigration destinations that differ on attributes that we believe determine the
immigration decision.4 By randomly assigning the values of these critical attributes across
respondents, and over the different binary options subjects choose from, we are able to
estimate the relative importance of each item for the resulting choice.
The outcome of interest in this experiment is the subject’s expressed preference over two
possible employment destinations. Student subjects are shown the profiles of two destinations
– Employment Destination 1 and Employment Destination 2 (those exact choice names are
provided). The subjects are simply asked “which of the employment destinations do you
prefer?”, as well as to rate separately how strongly they approve or disapprove of the two
destinations. Screenshots of the conjoint treatments are presented in the Online Appendix
3The conjoint technique was initially developed by market researchers to identify the relative influence
of different product features on consumer choice (Green and Rao, 1971). Conjoint designs have gained
increasing popularity as a means for identifying causal effects of different choices in a wide variety of sur-
vey experiments covering various fields in the social sciences (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto, 2013;
Hainmueller, Hangartner and Yamamoto, 2015).
4As can be seen in the experiment screenshot in the Online Appendix (Figure A6), respondents were
asked both to rate both candidates on a 7-point scale, as well as choose which destination they would prefer
to immigrate to. All analysis in the main paper focuses on the forced choice component.
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(Fig. A6-A8). Each employment destination has five attributes and each attribute has three
possible values. The values associated with each attribute are randomly assigned to each of
the two destinations for each choice set presented to the subjects.
A properly specified conjoint experiment includes the most salient choice attributes that
are likely to affect the choice made by the student subjects. The five attributes of the
conjoint design correspond to the factors we believe drive the migration decision for skilled
labor. Table 1 provides a full summary of the conjoint specifications, along with their values.
Immigration Treatment We implement three distinct conjoint experiments in each of the
online sessions. Each of these three experiments includes a different version of the “nativist”
immigration treatment. The nativist immigration treatments characterize, or signal, the
political or policy context of a country. In Conjoint 1, each of the subjects’ choice profiles
are randomly assigned one of the three immigration treatments: a relatively neutral one
(“Change in visa processing centers”); a positive one (“Implementation of a point system”;
and a negative, or “nativist”, value (”Restriction on Muslim immigration/tourist visas”).
We chose the ‘implementation of a point system’ policy treatment as the positive attribute
(compared to the other two policies) because it is generally perceived as favoring high-skilled
potential migrants. Points-based systems are considered by many to make it easier for high-
skilled migrants to gain entry compared to systems that do not weight admission decisions on
skill indicators (Tani, 2014). There is also considerable survey evidence suggesting that the
public, world-wide, is generally more favorable to skilled immigration (Blinder and Richards,
2018; Valentino et al., 2019). And, of course, given that our subjects are skilled potential
migrants our expectations is that this policy attribute would resonate quite positively.
In Conjoint 2, the negative immigration treatment is replaced with “Deportation of all
illegal immigrants”. In Conjoint 3, we replace the immigration policy treatment with a
new attribute randomly assigning one of three country labels (“Australia”, “U.K.”, or the
“U.S.”). For U.K. subjects, the U.K. label is changed to “Canada”. This third immigration
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Table 1: Immigration Conjoint Experiment Treatments
Conjoint 1 Conjoint 2 Conjoint 3
Social Benefits
Generous guaranteed Yes Yes Yes
monthly family allowance (+)
Basic hourly minimum wage (neutral) Yes Yes Yes
No state minimum wage or income support (-) Yes Yes Yes
Economy
Annual GDP Growth of 6 percent (+) Yes Yes Yes
Annual GDP Growth of 4 percent (neutral) Yes Yes Yes
Annual GDP Growth of 2 percent (-) Yes Yes Yes
Education (Average international rank)
Universities: 90th Percentile (+) Yes Yes Yes
Universities: 60th Percentile (neutral) Yes Yes Yes
Universities: 40th Percentile (-) Yes Yes Yes
Service Jobs (Average international rank)
Service salaries: 90th Percentile (+) Yes Yes Yes
Service salaries: 70th Percentile (neutral) Yes Yes Yes
Service salaries: 50th Percentile (-) Yes Yes Yes
Immigration One
Implementation of point-system (positive) (+) Yes No No
Change in visa processing centres (neutral) Yes No No
Restriction on Muslim Yes No No
immigration/tourist visas (-)
Immigration Two
Implementation of point-system (positive) (+) No Yes No
Change in visa processing centres (neutral) No Yes No
Deportation of all illegal immigrants (-) No Yes No
Country
United Kingdom / Canada No No Yes
Australia No No Yes
U.S. No No Yes
treatment is designed to test whether the U.S. ‘brand’ has been sufficiently tarnished by
‘Trumpian’ policies and rhetoric to cause potential highly skilled migrants to avoid the U.S.
Subjects make three choices per conjoint, for a total of nine choices. The random assignment
of attribute values allows us to estimate the relative importance of these nativist policy
declarations in shaping their emigration destination decisions.
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Alongside this immigration attribute, each destination choice has four additional at-
tributes. Again, the goal here is to capture as best as possible the range of emigration
destination features that might enter into the immigration decision. As the evidence sum-
marized earlier suggests, income is a preeminent consideration in the choice of emigration
destination. Accordingly, we include two attributes that we believe capture distinct dimen-
sions of income concerns. (1) The first attribute is simply the notion that higher economic
growth attracts new immigrants: GDP growth rates of 2, 4 and 6% are randomly assigned.
(2) A separate income attribute is salary, which we present as the average international rank
of salaries in the service sector. Again, there is random assignment of a high value (90th
percentile), neutral value (70th percentile), and low value (50th percentile).
The remaining two attributes are meant to capture the public goods provisions we noted
earlier that have been shown to affect migration decisions. (3) The education attribute has
three values: a positive one (universities ranked in the worlds top 90th percentile); a negative
one (universities ranked in the 40th percentile) and a neutral attribute (universities in the
60th percentile). (4) Our welfare benefits attribute includes three randomly assigned values:
a positive value (“generous monthly family allowance”), a negative one (“No state minimum
wage or income support”); and a neutral value (“Basic hourly minimum wage”).
Subject Pool A critical element in the experimental design is the choice of subject pools.
Our goal was to include subjects that represent distinct global talent pools from which U.S.
firms would recruit immigrant employees. The experiments were conducted with university
student subjects from the two most important talent pools for U.S. firms: China and India.
As we noted earlier, high-skilled immigrants from these two countries have been the primary
recipients of H-1B visas but also they have had significant positive effects on innovative,
high-tech industries. We also administered these experiments to university student subjects
from talent pools that play less central roles for U.S. firms, certainly less important roles for
U.S. high tech firms: Chile and the U.K. Nevertheless both countries have strong historical
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and political ties with the U.S. The U.K. represents a mature developed European economy
and Chile represents a highly developed Latin American economy. The U.S. has been a
dominant destination for emigrants from both countries.5
A further concern in selecting the subject pools was their skill profile. Our primary
interest is in understanding the migration preferences of high-skilled potential emigrants.
Accordingly, we administer the experimental treatments to subjects that resemble this sub-
group in the population. The experiments were conducted with subjects recruited to the
Nuffield Centre for Experimental Social Sciences (CESS) university student subject pools
in Chile, China, India, and the U.K. Respectively, these were students currently or recently
studying at the Universidad de Santiago de Chile; Nankai University (Tianjin); FLAME
University (Pune); and the University of Oxford. Most of these students had education
profiles that resembled those of skilled immigrants that might consider emigration to the
U.S.6
Finally, given the comparative element of this research design, a critical concern is that
we recruit similar kinds of subjects to the experiment and that the experiment take place
under very similar conditions. Since we implemented the experiment in the four Nuffield
CESS centers – Oxford, Pune, Tianjin and Santiago – we had good control over subject
recruitment and sampling. Each of these centers has an experimental lab and maintains
a student subject pool for experiments. In Oxford, Pune, and Santiago, subjects are re-
cruited from the student body into an ORSEE subject pool database. Students from the
Nankai University are recruited into the CESS Subject pool using a WeChat recruitment
5Migration statistics for Chile are available at http://www.registrodechilenos.cl/, and
for the U.K. at https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/
internationalmigration/
6We asked all respondents what subjects they were studying. There is considerable missing data for
this question, however, so we are very cautious about drawing definitive conclusions. In China, business
and economics is selected by over 50 percent of subjects while about 20 percent indicated engineering and
computer science majors. In India, we have roughly a similar 50 percent specializing in business, economics
and commerce while 15 percent selected engineering and computer science. In Chile, engineering is the most
selected major (about 25 percent of subjects) followed by medicine by about 20 percent of subjects. In the
U.K., science is the most selected major having been selected by over 30 percent of subjects. Unlike the
other countries, the social sciences and humanities is selected by about 35 percent of U.K. subjects.
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and database platform. The student subject recruitment procedures are similar across the
four centers. Nuffield CESS has a very strict no deception rule for all experiments conducted
with its subjects; all experiments, including those conducted online, are paid; and CESS has
very strict privacy and data protection rules. Subjects in the four locations are provided
with identical descriptions of the general experimental rules and procedures, all of which are
described in detail on the CESS web site: https://cess-nuffield.nuff.ox.ac.uk/
The experiments were conducted with Nuffield CESS Online facilities and implemented
on Qualtrics. Subjects were paid for their participation and aspects of the survey experiment
were incentivized.7. Participants in the study are predominantly young, as expected with a
student subject pool that includes post-graduates. Female participants slightly outnumber
males. The ideological preferences of subjects have a fairly normal distribution although the
U.K. subject pool is skewed slightly to the Left, whereas both Chile and India subjects are
slightly skewed to the Right. For density plots see Figures A1 – A5 in the Online Appendix.
Subjects were asked to indicate their interest in migrating on a scale that ranged from “Not
at all interested” (1) to “Very interested” (7). Mean subject pool responses were clearly
skewed towards “very interested” ranging between 5.5 and 6.0 in a 1–7 point scale. The full
summary statistics for subjects are presented in Table A1 in the Online Appendix.
Estimation strategy and results
We recover the causal estimates of specific characteristics of employment destinations with
logistic regression (with standard errors clustered by participant). For each choice option we
regress their binary decision on dichotomous variables representing the attribute values of
the destination choice. Since we are interested in the relative effects of levels within models,
the logistic coefficients are sufficient to demonstrate the difference in relative magnitude and
7Note the conjoint components of the survey were not incentivised. The mean completion time in Chile
was 22 minutes and subjects earned an average of £3.50; 17 minutes in China with average earnings of £6;
15 minutes in India with average earnings of £4; and 15 minutes in the U.K. with mean payoffs of £5.30.
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Deportation of all illegal immigrants
Muslim Ban
Change in visa processing centres
Point−system visa
Logit Coefficient
Subject Country ● Chile China India UK
Figure 2: Immigration policy treatment and country label logit coefficients from the three
separate conjoint experiments. Full results for each regression are reported in the Online
Appendix. 95% confidence intervals are shown for each point estimate, clustered by subject.
the direction of any causal effect within and between attributes. Readers should note that
these coefficients should not be directly interpreted as the marginal effect on the probability
of choosing a given destination.
Recall that subjects make choices for nine two-destination choice sets – each subject
makes three dichotomous choices for each of the three conjoint treatments.8 Figure 2 presents
graphical summaries of the estimated logit coefficients with 95 percent confidence intervals
for each country. For each of the three different immigration treatments we only present the
logit coefficients for the identically measured immigration policy attributes. Full regression
tables for each country model are included in the Online Appendix. The reference categories
for the conjoint attributes are the neutral categories included as dots with coefficient zero in
Figure 2.
8Checking the proportion of times individual conjoint levels were shown to subjects confirms that they
were adequately randomised (see Table A3). Further balance tests were also carried out to evaluate adequate
implementation of the randomization protocol and are available from the authors.
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The results for the three conjoint experiments tell a fairly consistent story about nativist
policy pronouncements and the destination preferences of skilled immigrants. In the first
immigration treatment, the “Muslim Ban” attribute has a large negative coefficient for stu-
dent subjects in both Chile and the U.K. For the India and China student subjects, the
coefficient is negative but almost half the size and barely indistinguishable from zero. In
the second immigration treatment the “Deportation of all illegal immigrants” attribute is
negative and large for both the U.K. and Chile. For Chinese and Indian student subjects
the coefficient is indistinguishable from zero. In the third Treatment, the “U.S.” value has
a negative coefficient in Chile and the U.K., indicating a large negative country brand effect
(relative to the baseline Australia). The magnitude of the U.S. brand treatment effect is
roughly half that of the “Muslim Ban” and ‘Deportation’ in the U.K., but it has a stronger
effect on Chilean student subjects relative to the ‘Muslim Ban’ and “Deportation of all illegal
immigrants”. Again, China and India are distinctive in that the U.S. brand attribute has
no discernible effect on their immigration destination choices.9
Overall these results suggest that the nativist rhetoric of ‘Trumpian’ politics has mixed
effects on the destination decisions of skilled migrants. The nativist rhetoric plays differently
depending on the audience. With respect to student subjects from the two most important
immigrant talent pools for U.S. firms, China and India, the overall effect on migration desti-
nation choice is essentially zero. This is the not the case with more traditional talent pools
that have historical ties to the U.S. but are much less important sources of human capital for
U.S. domestic firms. In both Chile and the U.K., the two nativist immigration treatments
and the U.S. brand name treatment had significant negative effects on the destination choices
of our student subjects.
As we pointed out earlier, each of the three different conjoint experiments included four
additional attributes that were designed to measure other important factors that shape
9In Appendix Figure A9, we report average marginal component effect (AMCE) estimates for the same
experimental data. The results of this alternative specification are consistent with those reported in Figure
2.
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the migration decision. For the sake of brevity, we only report the full results for the
conjoint experiment that included country names. These are reported in Table 2 for each
country. Aside from immigration treatments, the coefficients for the remaining attributes
are substantively and statistically similar across the three conjoint experiments. Complete
regression results for each conjoint experiment can be found in the Online Appendix.
Table 2: Treatment 3 (country labels) regression results by subjects’ country
Subject Country
Chile China India UK
Generous family allowance 0.476∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗∗ 0.113 0.568∗∗∗
(0.158) (0.125) (0.131) (0.138)
No minimum wage or income support −0.590∗∗∗ −0.625∗∗∗ −0.425∗∗∗ −0.511∗∗∗
(0.146) (0.121) (0.140) (0.153)
GDP 2 percent −0.528∗∗∗ −0.551∗∗∗ −0.264∗ −0.313∗∗
(0.156) (0.127) (0.143) (0.149)
GDP 6 percent 0.196 0.262∗∗ 0.427∗∗∗ 0.371∗∗
(0.154) (0.116) (0.142) (0.146)
Service salaries 50th pc −0.362∗∗ −0.491∗∗∗ −0.143 −0.165
(0.150) (0.127) (0.133) (0.159)
Service salaries 90th pc 0.254∗ 0.649∗∗∗ 0.028 0.236
(0.150) (0.133) (0.126) (0.149)
Canada 0.289∗
(0.149)
U.S.A −0.821∗∗∗ 0.139 0.031 −0.338∗
(0.145) (0.134) (0.143) (0.174)
U.K. −0.232∗ 0.361∗∗∗ −0.032
(0.132) (0.128) (0.143)
University Ranking 40th pc −0.348∗∗ −0.540∗∗∗ −0.059 −0.395∗∗
(0.150) (0.125) (0.141) (0.164)
University Ranking 90th pc 0.047 0.801∗∗∗ 0.206 0.179
(0.141) (0.124) (0.132) (0.156)
Constant 0.652∗∗∗ −0.147 0.041 0.038
(0.186) (0.166) (0.184) (0.186)
Observations 1,284 1,818 1,374 1,176
Log Likelihood −816.630 −1,111.285 −927.437 −761.972
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard errors clustered by subject.
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We expected that economic earnings should matter for the immigrant’s destination choice
and this is precisely what we find in our stated preference experiment. Higher GDP growth
increases the attractiveness of a destination, lower GDP growth deters potential high-skilled
migrants. The U.K. and Indian subjects have a particularly strong preference for destinations
with higher economic growth. Income opportunities for the highly skilled – proxied by service
sector salaries – also have the anticipated effect. They are particularly important for Chinese
student subjects and least important for those from India.
Public goods provision increases the attractiveness of an immigration destination. In all
four student subject pools the choice of an immigration destination is affected positively
by the availability of generous family allowances and negatively by the “no minimum wage
or income support” attribute (although the positive treatment is insignificant for Indian
subjects). University rankings are not important to Indian student subjects; however, there
is a very strong effect for the China student subject pool; and a somewhat mixed effect for
the U.K. and Chilean subjects.
Results for these additional attributes of the immigration destination are reassuring on a
number of fronts. First, they confirm findings from observational studies suggesting that the
decision to immigrate into a country is shaped by expected earnings but also by public goods
provision – social welfare benefits and education infrastructure, in particular. Second, the
fact that many of these other attributes are significant determinants of choice in our conjoint
lends credence to our claim that we have isolated the causal effect of nativist pronouncements
on the immigration decision. Under-specified conjoint experiments can result in inflated
effect sizes for the treatment attributes of interest.
U.S. Antipathy. An important implication of these findings is that the adoption of pop-
ulist or nativist measures designed to preclude certain types of immigration are ignored by
some potential immigrants but are important considerations for others. China and India
tend to be among the former while Chile and the U.K. tend toward the latter group. The
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implication, suggested by the third treatment results above, is that, for the Chileans and
British student subjects, the U.S. brand as an immigration destination has been tarnished.
With these data we can only speculate that Chilean and British exposure to nativist rhetoric
has eroded the brand reputation of the U.S. for high-skilled potential migrants.
We did, however, include an additional incentivised experiment in the online session that
confirms the antipathy held by Chilean and British student subjects towards the U.S. (and
the relatively more positive attitudes of Indian and Chinese subjects). Subjects were asked to
complete an Information Extraction Task (IET) that required them to read a short passage
of text describing the visa requirements for one of four countries, the U.K./Canada (for U.K.
subjects), the U.S., and Australia. Each subject was given free choice over which country’s
rules to read about, and this was followed by four incentivized questions concerning the text.
We treat the choice of country visa text as an unobtrusive, implicit measure of the student
subject’s preferences regarding immigration destinations.
Given the conjoint experiment results our expectation is that this unobtrusive measure of
immigration preference should find that Indian and Chinese subjects choose the U.S. option
much more than is the case for the Chilean and British subjects. This is precisely what we
see in Table 3. Chinese and Indian student subjects chose to answer questions on the United
States nearly 50% of the time. U.K. student subjects choose the U.S. roughly one-third of
the time, while Chileans choose the U.S. the least frequently.
Table 3: Proportion of times each country was chosen for the information extraction task
(by subject pool)
Choice
Subject Pool Australia United States U.K. Canada
U.K. 0.30 0.36 0.35
Chile 0.43 0.26 0.30
China 0.28 0.46 0.26
India 0.22 0.48 0.31
Subjects were also asked to rate each country as an employment destination. Student
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subjects in Chile rated Australia more favorably than both the U.S. and the U.K., whereas,
conversely, Chinese student subjects favored the U.S. over both the U.K. and Australia.
Student subjects in the U.K. rated Canada more favorably than Australia, but Australia
more favorably than the U.S. All these results are highly significant (see Appendix Table
A2). India is a clear exception, however, where subjects were statistically indifferent between
the three locations.
These results are consistent with the causal claim we make above: recent nativist pro-
nouncements by President Trump seem to resonate with Chilean and British potential skilled
immigrants but do not affect the immigration preferences of those from China and the India.
At least for participants in these high-skilled student subject pools, one’s country of origin
does seem to moderate preferences over named immigration destinations.
Treatment effect heterogeneity.
The results of both the conjoint experiments and IET suggest there are country differences in
how subjects respond to nativist policies. There are other plausible sources of heterogeneity.
We present three sub-group analyses of treatment effect heterogeneity: ideology, age, and
likelihood of emigrating respectively.10
Ideology. Nativist pronouncements (by Trump or others) are decidedly political and are
typically associated with populist sentiment from the political right (Golder, 2016). Some
of the antipathy towards the U.S. or towards the Trumpian nativist pronouncements might
be accounted for by the partisan leanings of potential skilled immigrants. The nativist
pronouncements may resonate with partisans of the right but leave partisans of the left
indifferent. We explore whether partisan leanings interact with the three treatment effects
in the conjoint experiment. Subjects in all four countries were asked to self-identify on a
10In the appendix, as a further robustness test, we also check for differences between men and women
respondents by estimating models for each gender separately. The results are broadly similar across genders
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Figure 3: Conjoint Results by Ideological Self-Placement. Logistic coefficients are plotted
with 95% confidence intervals clustered by subject.
11-point left-right continuum.11 For this analysis, subjects are divided into Left, Center, and
Right groups and then we estimate separate models using the the same conjoint specification
as in Figure 2.12 Graphical results for the immigration attribute across rounds for Left and
Right subjects are presented in Figure 3.13
We do observe partisan differences in the treatment effects. And there is evidence across
the student subject pools of stronger treatment effects for partisans of the Left compared to
those of the Right. Differences in the effect of nativist immigration policies are clearly more
evident in the U.K. and India where Left student subjects exhibit stronger, negative effects
for both the ‘Muslim ban’ and ‘Deportation of all illegal immigrants’ treatments. It is also
the case that Chile’s negative effect towards immigrant deportation appears to be driven by
11We acknowledge that the classic left-right self-identification might be problematic in Chinese context
and accordingly are hesitant to draw any hard conclusions from the results in China.
12Participants on the left were operationally defined as those who indicated they were 4 or lower on an
11-point scale, and Right those who selected 6 or more. We omit centrists to ensure the groups are comprised
only of those who situate themselves clearly on one side of the ideological spectrum or the other.
13Full numeric logistic estimations are not presented but are available upon request.
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the Left. Aversion to the U.S. country label is driven by the Left in the U.K., whereas both
left and right subjects in Chile are deterred by this label. Left respondents in China are, in
fact, more likely to prefer the destination if it is labeled as the U.S. Across the board, the
points-based visa system treatment is neutral as expected.
Age. While all four student subject pools have a clear skew towards young adult partic-
ipants, this is slightly less pronounced in Chile and the UK compared to India and China.
This difference also corresponds to the differences in the observed effects of nativist pol-
icy primes within the conjoint experiments. While we have no theoretical reason to think
that age would drive these differential results, the observed differences across countries may
nevertheless be confounded by age differences across subject pools.
To test the robustness of our findings, we run a pooled model for all respondents across the
four countries. We divide respondents into two groups (age ≤ 25; age > 25), and estimate
separate logistic models for each group and conjoint experiment. The models include all
conjoint attributes, plus country fixed effects. If age is a confounder, we would expect
that the nativist policy treatments would have differential impacts between young and old
categories. Specifically, given the observed differences in age distributions, older respondents
should be more negatively affected by these treatments.
Table 4 reports the immigration-related logit coefficients for these models. Full regression
results are available in the Online Appendix. Overall, the estimated effects are very similar
across the two groups. The direction of each effect is the same for each attribute level. The
deportation, point-system visa and Muslim ban policies do not exhibit substantial differences
in terms of the size of the effects. One notable difference is that there is some discrepancy
between younger and older subjects in terms of the size of the U.S. label in the third conjoint.
Despite the lower sample size, older subjects (irrespective of country) appear to react more
strongly than younger subjects to the U.S. attribute level in the third conjoint. However,
the U.S. effect is negative and at least borderline significant for both age cohorts.
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Table 4: Partial regression results run on a pooled sample, by age cohort
Conjoint 1 Conjoint 2 Conjoint 3
Age ≤ 25 Age ¿ 25 Age ≤ 25 Age ¿ 25 Age ≤ 25 Age ¿ 25
Deport illegal immigrants −0.321∗∗∗ −0.350∗
(0.080) (0.190)
Point-system visa 0.132∗ 0.214 0.199∗∗∗ 0.252
(0.073) (0.178) (0.077) (0.170)








Fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other attributes? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,758 894 4,758 894 4,758 894
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard errors clustered by subject.
In short, older student subjects (irrespective of country) do not appear to be driving the
differences in responses to nativist rhetoric between country subject pools. The difference in
effect size for the U.S. country attribute is interesting, though with the data in this paper we
can only speculate as to why older participants would react more strongly against this label.
With respect to the two explicitly nativist treatments there is no evidence of age cohort
differences.
Likelihood of emigrating. Clearly not all of these educated and young university sub-
jects are prospective emigrants. Nevertheless, their self-reported likelihood of emigrating is
high. We asked subjects, pre-treatment, “Thinking about the next 2 or 3 years, what is the
possibility that you would move to a foreign country to take a new job? ”. Subjects could
respond on a scale that ranged between ‘Not at all Likely’ (1) to “Very Likely” (7). Across
the four subject pools, the mean response was between 3.8 and 5.3 on this 7-point scale.
As a final test of preference heterogeneity, we assess whether our results hold for just those
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Figure 4: Logit coefficients for immigration policy treatments and country labels, for subjects
who rated their likelihood of emigrating as 4 or higher (out of 7). 95% confidence intervals
are shown for each point estimate clustered by subject.
subset the data to only include student subjects who rated their likelihood of emigrating as
4 or higher (on a 7 point scale). As before, we only plot the logit coefficients for the immi-
gration policy attributes and country labels. Full regression tables of the complete models
are available in the Online Appendix.
Figure 4 displays the results. Substantively, the results are very similar to those reported
for the full sample. Indian student subjects, who are more likely to emigrate, are slightly
more favourable towards the U.S. as a destination, and Chilean student subjects, most likely
to emigrate, are even more opposed to the U.S. as an emigration destination. Otherwise the
results resemble the full sample.
In this section we estimate heterogeneity in the nativist treatment effects. The treatment
effects of nativist rhetoric, and their variations across countries, that we observed in the full
sample, hold when we control for age cohort, ideology and likelihood of emigrating.
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Conclusion and Discussion
There is an increasingly global competition for highly skilled immigrants. While the U.S.
has historically attracted many high-skilled immigrants, this might be changing. In this
essay we examine whether the politics of immigration affects the immigration decision – in
particular the decision of high-skilled immigrants to move to the U.S. In order to isolate
the causal effect of nativist pronouncements on the immigration decision we implement a
stated choice conjoint experiment with student subject pools of likely skilled immigrants
in China, India, Chile and the U.K. Subjects are asked to choose between two different
immigration destinations that vary on five key attributes – one of which directly captures
nativist immigration policies. Across three different conjoint experiments, we test various
facets of this nativism: one invokes the “Muslim ban” rhetoric of Trump; a second alludes to
the deportation of illegal immigrants; and a third simply calls attention to the U.S.’ brand
image.
We find that the political populism, nativism, and anti-immigrant rhetoric of ‘Trumpian
policies’ deters high-skilled immigration to the U.S. But the negative effect on skilled immi-
gration of this anti-immigrant rhetoric likely varies across the global talent pool. Nativism
has a negative impact on the preferences of likely skilled immigrants from countries with
more developed economies, that have historical immigration ties with the U.S. but are not
an important source of immigration for U.S. firms. We base this conclusion on the overall
estimated conjoint results for our student subject pools in Chile and the U.K. In contrast,
again based on student subjects, we find that populist pronouncements have little overall
effect on the destination preferences of likely skilled immigrants from U.S. industries’ two
largest talent pools: China and India.
The nativist treatment effect differences between these two types of talent pools are quite
striking. One factor that might explain these differences is the political preferences of the
different talent pools. Populist immigration policies will not be well-received by partisans
of the Left. Our evidence is very much preliminary and is simply based on the student
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subjects’ self-identification on a Left-Right continuum. Even given these qualifications (or
possibly because of them), we do find that the nativist treatment effects are largely confined
to partisans of Left in the U.K.; there is some evidence of a nativist treatment effect for Left
partisans in India; while both Right and Left respond negatively in Chile.
The focus of this article is on the supply side of the immigration decision. Nevertheless,
the central finding is very much consistent with the extensive research on demand for im-
migration, i.e. public support for immigration (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014; Valentino
et al., 2019). Public support for immigration is very much motivated by socio-economic
concerns; how these policies would affect the country as a whole. Hence, for example, in
many countries there is relatively high support for immigration policies that favor skilled
immigration. These broader socio-tropic considerations also shape the supply-side decision;
specifically, the countries to which high-skilled immigrants decide to migrate. While much of
the recent anti-immigrant rhetoric of U.S. immigration policy does not have immediate self-
interested consequences for high-skilled immigrants, it of course reflects on broader policy
issues that are socio-tropic in nature. We provide evidence that this policy rhetoric dissuades
potential immigrants from selecting the U.S. as a migration destination. But the causal ef-
fect is restricted to our sample of more mature developed countries that have historically
supplied immigrants to the U.S. – Chile and the U.K. These socio-tropic concerns for the
Chinese and Indian student subjects do not seem to be negatively triggered by this recent
U.S. nativist rhetoric. One explanation is that high-skilled immigrants from China and India
may either share these nativist policy views or be indifferent to them. Alternatively, there
may be a “push” element to how high-skilled potential immigrants from China and India
assess overall immigration policy in the U.S. Our negative immigration policy treatments
might be perceived by some as considerably more moderate (or less negative) than their
prevailing policy environment, i.e., the push factor, in China and India. To the extent that
this is the case, the relative negative effect of the nativist treatments might be attenuated.
The global talent pool of skilled immigrants is heterogeneous. U.S. firms have an impor-
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tant economic interest in understanding the specific factors that account for the migration
destination of skilled migrants. Findings from our conjoint experiment provide some initial
insights into the heterogeneous effect of nativist pronouncements on the migration decisions
of the global talent pool of skilled migrants. At least for those talent pools that are of partic-
ular importance to U.S. firms, China and India, these anti-immigrant policy pronouncements
seem to have little effect on their choice of migration destinations.
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Appendix A Descriptive Statistics and Experimental
Protocol
This Appendix section provides further descriptive information about the subjects and ex-
perimental protocols within this study. Table A1 provides descriptive information about
subjects in each of the four country subject pools.
Figure A1 illustrates the young age skew to the subject pool. Figure A2 suggests a
slight female bias in the subject pool (except for India where we observe a slight male bias).
Figure A3 shows the self-placement of subjects along a left-right political spectrum. The
UK subject pool is slightly skewed to the left, the one in India to the right. Figure A4 shows
the distribution of subjects’ interest in emigrating, with similar patterns for each country.
Figure A5 displays the distributions of subjects’ self-reported likelihood of emigrating. China
exhibits a slightly lower density of subjects reporting a high likelihood compared to other
pools, but overall these distributions appear similar.
Table A2 presents the results of T-tests of the difference in subjects’ favourability between
immigration destinations, for each country subject pool separately.
Table A3 reports the proportion of times each conjoint attribute was displayed to subjects
in the pool. Overall these results show that the randomisation of attributes worked as
intended. Figures A6–A8 are example screenshots from the three separate immigration
conjoint experiments.
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Table A1: Summary of Subject Demographics
Country Variable Mean SD Min. Max. N
Chile
Age 23.14 3.97 19 53 214
Ideology 4.41 1.89 0 10 214
Favourability: Australia 7.61 1.42 3 9 214
Favourability: UK/Canada 6.31 1.82 3 9 214
Favourability: U.S.A. 6.54 1.88 3 10 214
Interest in emigrating 5.98 1.12 1 7 214
Likelihood of emigrating 4.72 1.85 1 7 214
Female 0.56 0.5 0 1 214
China
Age 22.28 5.48 19 49 303
Ideology 5.4 1.3 0 9 226
Favourability: Australia 6.24 1.54 3 10 303
Favourability: UK/Canada 6.19 1.22 3 9 303
Favourability: U.S.A. 6.52 1.35 3 9 303
Interest in emigrating 5.77 1.37 1 7 303
Likelihood of emigrating 3.84 1.8 1 7 303
Female 0.62 0.49 0 1 303
India
Age 22.97 7.31 19 64 229
Ideology 6.13 2.3 0 10 229
Favourability: Australia 5.27 1.28 1 7 228
Favourability: UK/Canada 5.35 1.35 1 7 228
Favourability: U.S.A. 5.33 1.52 1 7 229
Interest in emigrating 5.87 1.25 1 7 229
Likelihood of emigrating 5.35 1.44 2 7 227
Female 0.45 0.5 0 1 229
Uk
Age 25.81 8.58 19 68 196
Ideology 4.1 1.84 0 8 196
Favourability: Australia 5.18 1.25 1 7 196
Favourability: UK/Canada 5.6 1.27 1 7 196
Favourability: U.S.A. 4.61 1.65 1 7 196
Interest in emigrating 5.48 1.48 1 7 195
Likelihood of emigrating 4.91 1.76 2 7 195
Female 0.56 0.5 0 1 196
2
Figure A1: Age Distribution of Subject Pools
3
Figure A2: Gender Distribution of Subject Pools
4
Figure A3: Ideology Distribution of Subject Pools
5
Figure A4: Distribution of Subjects’ Interest in Emigrating
6
Figure A5: Distribution of Subjects’ Likelihood of Emigrating
7
Table A2: T-tests of differences in favourability between countries
Pair Chile China India U.K.
Australia - U.K. (Canada) 1.294 0.046 -0.079 -0.413
(p = 0) (p = 0.317) (p = 0.117) (p = 0)
Australia - U.S.A. 1.065 -0.287 -0.064 0.571
(p = 0) (p = 0) (p = 0.231) (p = 0)
U.S.A. - U.K. (Canada) 0.229 0.333 -0.015 -0.985
(p = 0.002) (p = 0) (p = 0.791) (p = 0)
Table A3: Summary of Conjoint Attribute Randomisation
Conjoint attribute variable Mean SD Min. Max. N
Basic hourly minimum wage 0.32 0.47 0 1 5504
Generous guaranteed monthly family allowance 0.34 0.47 0 1 5751
No state minimum wage or income support 0.34 0.47 0 1 5701
Annual GDP Growth of 2% 0.33 0.47 0 1 5620
Annual GDP Growth of 4% 0.34 0.47 0 1 5684
Annual GDP Growth of 6% 0.33 0.47 0 1 5652
Service salaries: 50th Percentile 0.33 0.47 0 1 5649
Service salaries: 70th Percentile 0.34 0.47 0 1 5747
Service salaries: 90th Percentile 0.33 0.47 0 1 5560
Change in visa processing centres 0.22 0.41 0 1 3692
Implementation of point-system 0.22 0.42 0 1 3776
Restriction on Muslim immigration/tourist visas 0.11 0.31 0 1 1891
Deportation of all illegal immigrants 0.11 0.32 0 1 1945
Australia 0.11 0.31 0 1 1892
Canada 0.02 0.15 0 1 392
U.S.A. 0.11 0.32 0 1 1915
U.K. 0.09 0.28 0 1 1453
Ranking of universities: 40th Percentile 0.33 0.47 0 1 5680
Ranking of universities: 60th Percentile 0.34 0.47 0 1 5685
Ranking of universities: 90th Percentile 0.33 0.47 0 1 5591
8
Figure A6: Screenshot from conjoint treatment 1
9
Figure A7: Screenshot conjoint treatment 2
10
Figure A8: Screenshot conjoint treatment 3
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Appendix B Additional models
Table A4: Chile only results
Treatment
(1) (2) (3)
Generous family allowance 0.374∗∗ 0.507∗∗∗ 0.476∗∗∗
(0.149) (0.150) (0.158)
No minimum wage or income support −0.710∗∗∗ −0.676∗∗∗ −0.590∗∗∗
(0.147) (0.142) (0.146)
GDP 2 percent −0.352∗∗ −0.511∗∗∗ −0.528∗∗∗
(0.151) (0.141) (0.156)
GDP 6 percent 0.275∗ 0.277∗ 0.196
(0.141) (0.149) (0.154)
Service salaries 50th pc −0.147 −0.492∗∗∗ −0.362∗∗
(0.145) (0.152) (0.150)
Service salaries 90th pc 0.068 −0.071 0.254∗
(0.143) (0.155) (0.150)
Deportation of all illegal immigrants −0.448∗∗∗
(0.156)








University Ranking 40th pc −0.162 −0.233 −0.348∗∗
(0.146) (0.152) (0.150)
University Ranking 90th pc 0.185 0.176 0.047
(0.158) (0.159) (0.141)
Constant 0.198 0.441∗∗ 0.652∗∗∗
(0.195) (0.190) (0.186)
Observations 1,284 1,284 1,284
Log Likelihood −828.891 −823.483 −816.630
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,679.781 1,668.967 1,655.261
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard errors clustered by subject.
12
Table A5: China only results
Model
(1) (2) (3)
Generous family allowance 0.379∗∗∗ 0.354∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗∗
(0.135) (0.132) (0.125)
No minimum wage or income support −0.316∗∗ −0.696∗∗∗ −0.625∗∗∗
(0.130) (0.128) (0.121)
GDP 2 percent −0.438∗∗∗ −0.487∗∗∗ −0.551∗∗∗
(0.119) (0.124) (0.127)
GDP 6 percent 0.306∗∗ 0.051 0.262∗∗
(0.119) (0.126) (0.116)
Service salaries 50th pc −0.576∗∗∗ −0.510∗∗∗ −0.491∗∗∗
(0.125) (0.124) (0.127)
Service salaries 90th pc 0.526∗∗∗ 0.689∗∗∗ 0.649∗∗∗
(0.130) (0.127) (0.133)
Deportation of all illegal immigrants −0.049
(0.128)








University Ranking 40th pc −0.804∗∗∗ −0.588∗∗∗ −0.540∗∗∗
(0.125) (0.116) (0.125)
University Ranking 90th pc 0.740∗∗∗ 0.838∗∗∗ 0.801∗∗∗
(0.120) (0.131) (0.124)
Constant 0.159 0.040 −0.147
(0.148) (0.168) (0.166)
Observations 1,818 1,818 1,818
Log Likelihood −1,106.039 −1,111.614 −1,111.285
Akaike Inf. Crit. 2,234.078 2,245.228 2,244.570
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard errors clustered by subject.
13
Table A6: India only results
Treatment
(1) (2) (3)
Generous family allowance 0.285∗∗ 0.217 0.113
(0.124) (0.139) (0.131)
No minimum wage or income support −0.404∗∗∗ −0.219 −0.425∗∗∗
(0.130) (0.141) (0.140)
GDP 2 percent −0.019 −0.320∗∗ −0.264∗
(0.143) (0.139) (0.143)
GDP 6 percent 0.399∗∗∗ 0.370∗∗∗ 0.427∗∗∗
(0.145) (0.133) (0.142)
Service salaries 50th pc −0.071 −0.419∗∗∗ −0.143
(0.131) (0.149) (0.133)
Service salaries 90th pc −0.021 −0.075 0.028
(0.131) (0.147) (0.126)
Deportation of all illegal immigrants −0.220
(0.146)








University Ranking 40th pc −0.132 −0.071 −0.059
(0.141) (0.141) (0.141)
University Ranking 90th pc 0.172 0.300∗∗ 0.206
(0.146) (0.143) (0.132)
Constant −0.026 0.145 0.041
(0.182) (0.176) (0.184)
Observations 1,374 1,374 1,374
Log Likelihood −924.794 −923.602 −927.437
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,871.589 1,869.205 1,876.873
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard errors clustered by subject.
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Table A7: UK only results
Treatment
(1) (2) (3)
Generous family allowance 0.778∗∗∗ 0.553∗∗∗ 0.568∗∗∗
(0.150) (0.159) (0.138)
No minimum wage or income support −0.613∗∗∗ −0.509∗∗∗ −0.511∗∗∗
(0.168) (0.157) (0.153)
GDP 2 percent −0.233 −0.368∗∗ −0.313∗∗
(0.155) (0.152) (0.149)
GDP 6 percent 0.312∗∗ 0.475∗∗∗ 0.371∗∗
(0.154) (0.157) (0.146)
Service salaries 50th pc 0.088 −0.131 −0.165
(0.159) (0.147) (0.159)
Service salaries 90th pc 0.504∗∗∗ 0.335∗∗ 0.236
(0.159) (0.151) (0.149)
Deportation of all illegal immigrants −0.660∗∗∗
(0.174)








University Ranking 40th pc −0.135 −0.421∗∗∗ −0.395∗∗
(0.149) (0.153) (0.164)
University Ranking 90th pc 0.462∗∗∗ 0.128 0.179
(0.151) (0.157) (0.156)
Constant −0.157 0.113 0.038
(0.195) (0.190) (0.186)
Observations 1,176 1,176 1,176
Log Likelihood −737.745 −745.252 −761.972
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,497.490 1,512.504 1,545.944
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard errors clustered by subject.
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Table A8: Pooled results
Model
(1) (2) (3)
Generous family allowance 0.432∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗∗ 0.354∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.071) (0.067)
No minimum wage or income support −0.473∗∗∗ −0.514∗∗∗ −0.545∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.070) (0.069)
GDP 2 percent −0.269∗∗∗ −0.397∗∗∗ −0.401∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.068) (0.070)
GDP 6 percent 0.311∗∗∗ 0.282∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.069) (0.068)
Service salaries 50th pc −0.202∗∗∗ −0.391∗∗∗ −0.294∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.070) (0.070)
Service salaries 90th pc 0.274∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗ 0.308∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.071) (0.068)
Deportation of all illegal immigrants −0.320∗∗∗
(0.074)










University Ranking 40th pc −0.366∗∗∗ −0.346∗∗∗ −0.341∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.069) (0.071)
University Ranking 90th pc 0.393∗∗∗ 0.369∗∗∗ 0.349∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.073) (0.068)
Chile −0.010 −0.001 0.106∗
(0.026) (0.027) (0.056)
China −0.022 0.005 0.069
(0.024) (0.024) (0.055)
India −0.016 −0.029 0.078
(0.026) (0.027) (0.055)
Constant 0.080 0.180∗∗ 0.058
(0.090) (0.092) (0.096)
Observations 5,652 5,652 5,652
Log Likelihood −3,669.929 −3,665.671 −3,676.422
Akaike Inf. Crit. 7,367.858 7,359.342 7,382.844
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01












Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3





Deportation of all illegal immigrants
Muslim Ban
Change in visa processing centres
Implementation of point−system
AMCE Estimate
Subject Country ● Chile China India UK
Figure A9: Average marginal component effect (AMCE) estimates for immigration and
country attributes across the four student subject pools. 95% confidence intervals are shown
for each estimate (clustered by subject).
17
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Generous family allowance 0.411∗∗∗ 0.519∗∗∗
(0.075) (0.163)
No minimum wage or income support −0.506∗∗∗ −0.333∗
(0.076) (0.180)
GDP 2 percent −0.275∗∗∗ −0.253
(0.075) (0.186)
GDP 6 percent 0.314∗∗∗ 0.306∗
(0.074) (0.176)
Service salaries 50th pc −0.267∗∗∗ 0.136
(0.075) (0.177)
Service salaries 90th pc 0.250∗∗∗ 0.387∗∗
(0.077) (0.159)
Point-system visa 0.132∗ 0.214
(0.073) (0.178)
Muslim Ban −0.447∗∗∗ −0.422∗∗
(0.077) (0.173)
University Ranking 40th pc −0.389∗∗∗ −0.249
(0.075) (0.186)











Log Likelihood −3,074.682 −589.690
Akaike Inf. Crit. 6,177.363 1,207.381
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard errors clustered by subject.
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Generous family allowance 0.422∗∗∗ 0.281
(0.078) (0.177)
No minimum wage or income support −0.542∗∗∗ −0.348∗
(0.074) (0.199)
GDP 2 percent −0.450∗∗∗ −0.152
(0.076) (0.160)
GDP 6 percent 0.265∗∗∗ 0.372∗∗
(0.076) (0.171)
Service salaries 50th pc −0.465∗∗∗ −0.014
(0.077) (0.163)
Service salaries 90th pc 0.199∗∗ 0.394∗∗
(0.079) (0.172)
Deportation of all illegal immigrants −0.321∗∗∗ −0.350∗
(0.080) (0.190)
Point-system visa 0.199∗∗∗ 0.252
(0.077) (0.170)
University Ranking 40th pc −0.408∗∗∗ −0.047
(0.076) (0.151)











Log Likelihood −3,063.235 −594.463
Akaike Inf. Crit. 6,154.471 1,216.925
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard errors clustered by subject.
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Generous family allowance 0.329∗∗∗ 0.483∗∗∗
(0.073) (0.182)
No minimum wage or income support −0.568∗∗∗ −0.464∗∗∗
(0.075) (0.172)
GDP 2 percent −0.376∗∗∗ −0.552∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.154)
GDP 6 percent 0.305∗∗∗ 0.379∗∗
(0.074) (0.166)
Service salaries 50th pc −0.307∗∗∗ −0.239
(0.076) (0.185)








University Ranking 40th pc −0.289∗∗∗ −0.605∗∗∗
(0.076) (0.190)











Log Likelihood −3,091.884 −574.473
Akaike Inf. Crit. 6,213.768 1,178.947
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard errors clustered by subject.
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Table A20: Full logistic regression results, on only those subjects likely to emigrate (immi-
gration treatment 1)
Immigration Treatment 1
Chile China India UK
Generous family allowance 0.368∗∗ 0.276 0.299∗∗ 0.766∗∗∗
(0.176) (0.182) (0.134) (0.175)
No minimum wage or income support −0.796∗∗∗ −0.269 −0.299∗∗ −0.529∗∗∗
(0.174) (0.183) (0.141) (0.192)
GDP 2 percent −0.415∗∗ −0.444∗∗∗ −0.062 −0.206
(0.173) (0.162) (0.155) (0.180)
GDP 6 percent 0.188 0.318∗ 0.325∗∗ 0.324∗
(0.167) (0.169) (0.157) (0.181)
Service salaries 50th pc −0.130 −0.390∗∗ −0.103 −0.044
(0.170) (0.167) (0.142) (0.182)
Service salaries 90th pc 0.086 0.461∗∗∗ −0.100 0.444∗∗
(0.170) (0.179) (0.144) (0.183)
Point-system visa 0.401∗∗ −0.128 0.152 0.144
(0.166) (0.156) (0.147) (0.178)
Muslim Ban −0.638∗∗∗ −0.393∗∗ −0.287∗ −0.806∗∗∗
(0.169) (0.168) (0.158) (0.191)
University Ranking 40th pc −0.248 −0.924∗∗∗ −0.161 −0.095
(0.172) (0.167) (0.156) (0.176)
University Ranking 90th pc 0.079 0.720∗∗∗ 0.195 0.635∗∗∗
(0.184) (0.159) (0.156) (0.181)
Constant 0.365 0.259 0.003 −0.207
(0.226) (0.207) (0.199) (0.240)
Observations 954 1,002 1,200 870
Log Likelihood −609.731 −614.942 −810.289 −545.917
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,241.462 1,251.885 1,642.578 1,113.835
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard errors clustered by subject.
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Table A21: Full logistic regression results, on only those subjects likely to emigrate (immi-
gration treatment 2)
Immigration Treatment 2
Chile China India UK
Generous family allowance 0.485∗∗∗ 0.139 0.161 0.629∗∗∗
(0.173) (0.183) (0.146) (0.178)
No minimum wage or income support −0.673∗∗∗ −0.624∗∗∗ −0.261∗ −0.407∗∗
(0.162) (0.170) (0.150) (0.186)
GDP 2 percent −0.410∗∗ −0.590∗∗∗ −0.343∗∗ −0.371∗∗
(0.164) (0.162) (0.148) (0.178)
GDP 6 percent 0.344∗∗ −0.128 0.383∗∗∗ 0.666∗∗∗
(0.173) (0.171) (0.146) (0.186)
Service salaries 50th pc −0.507∗∗∗ −0.206 −0.354∗∗ −0.198
(0.170) (0.158) (0.159) (0.181)
Service salaries 90th pc −0.225 0.789∗∗∗ 0.031 0.323∗
(0.172) (0.176) (0.157) (0.178)
Deportation of all illegal immigrants −0.612∗∗∗ −0.134 −0.270∗ −0.665∗∗∗
(0.179) (0.168) (0.153) (0.202)
Point-system visa 0.075 0.347∗∗ −0.115 0.308
(0.168) (0.160) (0.141) (0.199)
University Ranking 40th pc −0.104 −0.440∗∗∗ −0.115 −0.309∗
(0.173) (0.151) (0.153) (0.181)
University Ranking 90th pc 0.145 0.847∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗ 0.164
(0.179) (0.180) (0.155) (0.185)
Constant 0.503∗∗ 0.032 0.185 0.001
(0.206) (0.237) (0.195) (0.224)
Observations 954 1,002 1,200 870
Log Likelihood −612.337 −626.516 −804.975 −547.885
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,246.674 1,275.031 1,631.950 1,117.769
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard errors clustered by subject.
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Table A22: Full logistic regression results, on only those subjects likely to emigrate (immi-
gration treatment 3)
Immigration Treatment 3
Chile China India UK
Generous family allowance 0.448∗∗ 0.225 0.121 0.491∗∗∗
(0.190) (0.163) (0.139) (0.169)
No minimum wage or income support −0.632∗∗∗ −0.732∗∗∗ −0.324∗∗ −0.532∗∗∗
(0.161) (0.154) (0.150) (0.181)
GDP 2 percent −0.553∗∗∗ −0.497∗∗∗ −0.293∗ −0.227
(0.183) (0.178) (0.153) (0.163)
GDP 6 percent 0.220 0.247 0.449∗∗∗ 0.322∗∗
(0.178) (0.153) (0.148) (0.164)
Service salaries 50th pc −0.255 −0.315∗ −0.052 −0.062
(0.172) (0.176) (0.145) (0.188)
Service salaries 90th pc 0.406∗∗ 0.712∗∗∗ 0.039 0.250
(0.169) (0.181) (0.133) (0.175)
Canada 0.455∗∗
(0.178)
U.S.A −0.964∗∗∗ 0.104 0.126 −0.274
(0.172) (0.185) (0.150) (0.199)
U.K. −0.308∗∗ 0.357∗∗ 0.010
(0.143) (0.165) (0.154)
University Ranking 40th pc −0.266 −0.435∗∗∗ −0.060 −0.342∗
(0.181) (0.167) (0.151) (0.186)
University Ranking 90th pc 0.014 0.859∗∗∗ 0.220 0.166
(0.163) (0.163) (0.139) (0.170)
Constant 0.657∗∗∗ −0.213 −0.084 −0.060
(0.219) (0.234) (0.195) (0.215)
Observations 954 1,002 1,200 870
Log Likelihood −599.598 −617.476 −810.573 −567.889
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,221.195 1,256.952 1,643.147 1,157.777
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard errors clustered by subject.
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